Health Care Held Ransom: Modifications to Data Breach Security & the Future of Health Care Privacy Protection by Krisby, Ryan M.
Health Matrix: The Journal of Law-
Medicine
Volume 28 | Issue 1
2018
Health Care Held Ransom: Modifications to Data
Breach Security & the Future of Health Care
Privacy Protection
Ryan M. Krisby
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/healthmatrix
Part of the Health Law and Policy Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Health Matrix: The Journal of Law-Medicine by an authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve University
School of Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
Ryan M. Krisby, Health Care Held Ransom: Modifications to Data Breach Security & the Future of Health Care Privacy Protection, 28
Health Matrix 365 (2018)
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/healthmatrix/vol28/iss1/6
Health Matrix 28·Issue 1·2018 
365 
Health Care Held Ransom: 
Modifications to Data Breach 
Security & the Future of Health 
Care Privacy Protection 
Ryan M. Krisby† 
Contents 
I.  Introduction ................................................................. 366 
II. Background .................................................................. 369
A.  HIPAA & Risk .......................................................................... 369 
B.  HIPAA’s Security Rule ............................................................. 371 
1. Physical Safeguards ............................................................. 373
2. Administrative Safeguards .................................................. 373
3. Technical Safeguards ........................................................... 374
C.  Ransomware ............................................................................. 375 
1. Encryption ........................................................................... 375
2. Ransomware Attacks ........................................................... 376
3. The Current State of Data Security in Healthcare ............. 378
4. The Cost of Ransomware and Other Cyber-threats ........... 381
D.  The Problem of Outsourcing .................................................... 382 
III. Recommendations .......................................................... 383
A.  Mandate Stricter Technical Requirements ............................... 383 
1. Require a 3-2-1 Rule for Data Backup ................................ 384
2. Encryption ........................................................................... 385
3. Data-at-rest v. Data-in-motion ........................................... 387
4. Prohibit Use of Generic Usernames ..................................... 389
5. Require Access-Triggered Breach Notification .................... 390
B.  Provide Clearer & Simplified Compliance Guidelines .............. 391 
C.  A Flexible Administrative Standard ......................................... 393 
D.  Addressing the Outsourcing Problem ....................................... 395 
IV. The Federal Trade Commission .................................... 396
A.  FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp. ........................................ 396 
B.  In re LabMD ............................................................................. 398 
† J.D. Candidate, 2018, Case Western Reserve University School of Law; 
B.A. University of Dayton; winner of  the Health Matrix Outstanding 
Note of the Year (2017). I would like to thank Professor Sharona Hoffman 
for her guidance and invaluable insight throughout the process of writing 
this Note. I would also like to thank my peers at Health Matrix, for 
keeping me sane all the while. Finally, I would like to thank the following: 
Mom and Dad (for your bottomless supply of love and support) and 
Jessica Edelstein (for the humbling reminder that I am not as cool as I 
sometimes believe myself to be). 
Health Matrix·Volume 28·Issue 1·2018 
Health Care Held Ransom: Modifications to Data Breach Security & the 
Future of Health Care Privacy Protection 
366 
C.  FTC on the Move ..................................................................... 399 
D.  Implications for Healthcare Providers ...................................... 400 
V.  Conclusion .................................................................... 401 
 
I. Introduction 
“Hospital and healthcare software security can always be 
marginally improved, but if we want to lower the risk of healthcare 
security breaches, we need to take a very different approach. Only 
marginal improvements can be made by investing in more of the 
same resources in the problem, and the [return on investment] 
has diminishing marginal returns. A better approach is to 
understand the root causes at the core of healthcare security 
breaches.” 
   —Ron Avignone1 
 
On February 5, 2016, Hollywood Presbyterian Medical Center in 
Los Angeles, California, was held hostage when an anonymous hacker 
infiltrated its information systems.2 The security breach shut down the 
hospital’s entire information system—the computerized databases 
storing all the hospital’s electronic information—sending the hospital 
offline for more than a week.3 Doctors and other hospital employees 
were unable to access any electronic documents, patient data, or even 
e-mail.4 The cybercriminal had somehow pierced the security of the 
Medical Center, and once inside was able to encrypt all of the files on 
the Center’s information system.5 This resulted in the data being 
“translated” into a different form, unreadable to anyone without a specific 
password.6 Without that password, the hospital was locked out of 
 
1. Ron Avignone is founder of Giva, a California-based tech company that 
centers around help desk applications. Ron Avignone, Ethical hacking a 
vital necessity to fight against healthcare ransomware, MED. ECON. (April 
27, 2016), http://medicaleconomics.modernmedicine.com/medical-econ
omics/news/ethical-hacking-vital-necessity-fight-against-healthcare-
randsomeware. 
2. See Trevor Mogg, Hollywood Hospital Pays $17,000 to Ransomware 
Hackers, DIGITAL TRENDS (Feb. 18, 2016), http://www.digitaltrends
.com/computing/hollywood-hospital-ransomware-attack/. 
3. Id. 
4. Id. 
5. Id. 
6. What is Data Encryption?, DIGITAL GUARDIAN https://digitalguardian
.com/blog/what-data-encryption (last updated July 27, 2017) (explaining 
that the process of encryption “translates” plaintext—readable data—into 
ciphertext, which is almost entirely unreadable compared to its prior 
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accessing any data on its system. Unfortunately for the hospital, a 
restoration of access to its data had a price: $17,000 in the form of 
bitcoin, a digital currency.7 
Hollywood Presbyterian Medical Center eventually relented and 
paid the $17,000 ransom.8 Allen Stefanek, the Chief Executive of the 
Medical Center, explained that paying the sum demanded by the hacker 
was “[t]he quickest and most efficient way to restore [its] systems and 
administrative functions.”9 Although Stefanek attempted to downplay 
the breach by announcing that no patient information or hospital 
records were compromised,10 the fact still remains that an unknown 
cybercriminal infiltrated the Medical Center’s cybersecurity and gained 
access to the sensitive health information of its patients. Although the 
hacker decided to encrypt the data files and demand a ransom, it could 
also have decided to simply steal the information outright.11 
Today, patients find themselves in a digital economy.12 Industries 
have been swept into the current of the data-driven world and have 
been forced to adapt accordingly to survive.13 Healthcare is no different. 
The trend of patient-centered “on demand” services has pushed 
healthcare providers into the digital age of integrating technology into 
the practice of medicine, both in the solutions they offer patients and 
the administration of healthcare organizations.14 Entrance into the  
form). This process is described in greater detail in Part II, section C of 
this Note. 
7. Danny Yadron, Los Angeles Hospital Paid $17,000 in Bitcoin to 
Ransomware Hackers, The Guardian (Feb. 17, 2016), https://www.the
guardian.com/technology/2016/feb/17/los-angeles-hospital-hacked-
ransom-bitcoin-hollywood-presbyterian-medical-center. 
8. Id. 
9. Richard Winton, Hollywood Hospital Pays $17,000 in Bitcoin to Hackers; 
FBI Investigating, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 18, 2016), http://www.latime
s.com/business/technology/la-me-ln-hollywood-hospital-bitcoin-
20160217-story.html. 
10. Id. 
11. See, e.g., Chris Stobing, Ransomware is the New Hot Threat Everyone is 
Talking About; What do You Need to Know?, DIGITAL TREND (June 6, 
2015), http://www.digitaltrends.com/computing/what-is-ransomware-
and-should-you-be-worried-about-it/ (“[Ransomware] offered a simple, 
and reliable revenue stream that the underground market could capitalize 
on to fund other, less-profitable operations.”). 
12. See Lindsey Anderson & Irving Wladawsky-Berger, The 4 Things It Takes 
to Succeed in the Digital Economy, HARV. BUS.REV. (Mar. 24, 2016), 
https://hbr.org/2016/03/the-4-things-it-takes-to-succeed-in-the-digital-
economy. 
13. Id. 
14. See Dennis Bonilla, Five Tips You Need to Ease Patient Concerns in the 
Digital Age, MODERN HEALTHCARE http://www.modernhealthcare.com
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digital realm comes a host of cybernetic threats. Unlike many other 
industries, however, healthcare providers control troves of highly 
sensitive information, a fact of which their patients are hyperaware.15 
As a result, healthcare providers have a target on their back.16 Ransom-
ware is a new menace on the cyber-threat scene and has recently begun 
targeting hospitals and other healthcare providers. And while 
Hollywood Presbyterian Medical Center’s attack garnered a lot of 
attention, it was not the first of its kind and certainly will not be the 
last. 
Early in February 2016, Methodist Hospital in Henderson, 
Kentucky declared a “state of emergency” when a hacker prevented the 
hospital from accessing patient files.17 The following month, MedStar 
Health—a health system that operates ten hospitals and over 250 out-
patient facilities—was attacked and forced to shut down its entire 
records database.18 Between October 2015 and January 2017, an 
unauthorized user accessed patient information held by Verity Medical 
Foundation.19 The compromised information included the names, birth 
dates, medical record numbers, addresses, and credit card numbers of 
more than 9,000 individual patients.20 Verity failed to detect the breach 
until January 6, 2017.21 On January 3, 2017, Emory Healthcare—an 
Atlanta-based hospital system—discovered a compromise of 
approximately 80,000 records of patients who used its online 
 
/article/20161101/SPONSORED/161109984/five-tips-you-need-to-ease-
patient-concerns-in-the-digital-age (last accessed Mar. 8, 2017). 
15. Id. (“Our consumers are hyperaware of the sensitive information included 
in their health records.”). 
16. See Akanksha Jayanthi, 16 Latest Healthcare Data Breaches, Security 
Incidents, HEALTH IT & CIO REV. (Sept. 26, 2016), http://www.beckers
hospitalreview.com/healthcare-information-technology/16-latest-health
care-data-breaches-security-incidents.html (reporting sixteen healthcare 
data breaches or incidents occurring within a single four-week period). 
17. Kim Zetter, Why Hospitals are the Perfect Targets for Ransomware, 
WIRED (Mar. 30, 2016), available at: https://www.wired.com/2016/03/
ransomware-why-hospitals-are-the-perfect-targets/. 
18. John Woodrow Cox, Karen Turner & Matt Zapotosky, Virus infects 
MedStar Health system’s computers, forcing an online shutdown, 
WASH.POST (Mar. 28, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local
/virus-infects-medstar-health-systems-computers-hospital-officials-say/
2016/03/28/480f7d66-f515-11e5-a3ce-f06b5ba21f33_story.html. 
19. Verity Health System Notifies Patients of Data Incident, BUSINESS WIRE 
(Feb. 6, 2017), http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/201702060058
55/en. 
20. Id. 
21. Id. 
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appointment system.22 As illustrated here, by a mere handful of breach 
examples, the cybersecurity of many healthcare providers is inadequate. 
These attacks continue to happen despite the number of requirements 
healthcare providers must meet to protect the sensitive information of 
their patients. Federal regulation regarding the protection of patient 
privacy is rooted in the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) and its subsequent regulations.23 
In particular, the Security Rule implemented by the United States 
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) in accordance with 
HIPAA governs the safeguards healthcare providers and other covered 
entities must establish for the protection of electronic patient data.24 
While the Security Rule promulgates many safeguards for the 
protection of patient data, it still falls short in light of new cyber-
threats, such as ransomware. Data breaches continue to happen, and 
they continue to happen on a gigantic scale. 
In sum, current federal data breach security regulation fails to 
adequately protect patient data. In light of recently developing threats 
to electronic personal health data, HIPAA’s Security Rule should be 
modified to provide more stringent protections, while maintaining the 
flexibility and scalability promulgated by HIPAA. 
Part II of this Note provides background on data breach security 
under HIPAA. In particular, it describes the federal regulations for the 
protection of electronic health data and explains ransomware and the 
threat it poses to data security. Part III of this Note highlights the 
inadequacies of federal data breach regulations and proposes modifications 
that address these inadequacies both generally and concerning 
ransomware more specifically. Finally, Part IV discusses recent actions 
by the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) and how its enforcement 
actions provide an impetus for healthcare organizations to carry out 
data security modifications. 
II. Background
A. HIPAA & Risk 
HIPAA is in large part about risk. Risk is “used colloquially to 
suggest that an action or decision may lead to a negative outcome.”25 
22. Rachel Arndt, Emory Healthcare Cyberattack Affects 80,000 Patient
Records, MODERN HEALTHCARE (Mar. 2, 2017), http://www.modern
healthcare.com/article/20170302/NEWS/170309983/emory-healthcare-
cyberattack-affects-80000-patient-records.
23. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 1320d et seq. (2016).
24. See generally 45 C.F.R. §§ 160 & 164 (2016).
25. Kristin N. Johnson, Managing Cyber Risks, 50 GA. L. REV. 547, 556 (2016)
(citing GEOFFREY PARSONS MILLER, THE LAW OF GOVERNANCE, RISK
MANAGEMENT, AND COMPLIANCE 535 (2014)).
Health Matrix·Volume 28·Issue 1·2018 
Health Care Held Ransom: Modifications to Data Breach Security & the 
Future of Health Care Privacy Protection 
370 
More accurately, however, risk simply means uncertainty.26 The cause 
of this uncertainty may stem from a variety of factors, including human 
error, flaws in the organizational system, technical system failures, or a 
multitude of external factors.27 In respect to only the uncertain negative 
outcomes, risk management can be characterized as the avoidance or 
limiting of these negative risks. 
The following visualization of structural risk illustrates the 
relationship between risk factors and potential negative outcomes: 
  Figure 1.28 
Z1, Z2, Z3, . . . Z7 represent several kinds of unfavorable events. Y1 
is an undesired outcome. Event Y1 will occur if at least one of any of 
the events in the set Z1, . . . ,Z7 occur. Assuming any event in 
Z1, . . . ,Z7 either will, or will not, occur, any person or organization 
wanting to eliminate the occurrence of Y1 will want to in some way 
limit the set of events leading to that outcome.29 Take, for example, a 
ship carrying bottles of wine from a vineyard in France to a wine 
distributor in the United States. The undesired outcome of this voyage 
is the wine not making it safely to the wine distributor in the U.S. A 
series of events may lead to the wine not making it stateside: the wine 
bottles may be damaged, the cargo may be lost at sea, the ship may 
strike a leak and sink, or the ship may be commandeered by pirates. 
The seller-vineyard—in order to avoid this undesired outcome—would 
enforce certain requirements on his carrier to limit the set of events 
that would lead to it: properly storing and fastening the cargo of wine 
26. Id. (“Risk simply describes an element of uncertainty or the chance for a
range of possible outcomes.”).
27. Ekaterina Karaseva, Ability of Logical and Probabilistic Model for Oper-
ational Risk Management, 11 RELIABILITY: THEORY & APPLICATION 23,
23 (Sept. 2016).
28. See id. at 24 for the original model (“Structural model of operational risk
for first business line.”).
29. Id. at 25 (discussing the model and explaining the relationship between
outcome Y and the Z-set of events).
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bottles, ensuring any holes in the ship are sealed to not let in water, 
and avoiding routes known for pirate attacks.30 
Similarly, HIPAA imposes many requirements on healthcare 
providers to avoid the undesired outcome of unauthorized access of 
patients’ personal health information. Like the carrier of the wine, 
healthcare providers carry the precious information of their patients. 
And, like the seller-vineyard, HIPAA is deeply concerned with how that 
“cargo” is handled. There are a lot of requirements promulgated under 
HIPAA.31 These requirements aim to address vulnerabilities that are 
commonly exploited and cause an undesired outcome.32 While the 
requirements under HIPAA address a wide variety of risk factors, the 
section that specifically provides for the protection of electronic health 
information is known as the Security Rule.33 
B. HIPAA’s Security Rule 
Regulations promulgated by HHS under HIPAA are commonly 
referred to as the Privacy and Security Rules.34 HIPAA was amended 
in 2009 by the Health Information Technology for Economic and 
Clinical Health Act (HITECH)35 and updated in January 2013 with 
HHS’s publication of the Omnibus Final Rule.36 While the Privacy Rule 
protects all “individually identifiable health information,”37 the Security 
Rule protects only electronic protected health information (ePHI) and 
is therefore the basis for federal data breach security regulation.38 
 
30. The facts of this hypothetical are inspired by the facts of Rheinberg-
Kellerei GMBH v. Vineyard Wine Co., 281 S.E. 2d 425 (1981) in which a 
large shipment of wine lost at sea resulted not only in a contract dispute, 
but a sea full of drunken fish. 
31. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320d (2006). 
32. HIPAA for Professionals, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERV. https://
www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/index.html (last updated on June 
16, 2017) (“To improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the health care 
system . . . [HIPAA] required HHS to adopt national standards for 
electronic health care transactions . . . ”). 
33. 45 C.F.R. §§ 160 & 164 (2016). 
34. See 45 C.F.R. §§160, 162, 164 (2016). 
35. 42 U.S.C. §17935 (2016). 
36. See General Administration Requirements, 45 C.F.R. §160 (2016) and 
Security and Privacy, 45 C.F.R. § 164 (2016). 
37. See 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2016). 
38. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.306(a)(1) (2016). 
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ePHI is electronically stored, personally identifiable health information 
collected from an individual.39 These data are stored in health information 
systems (HIS) around the globe “in hospitals, research centers, and 
diagnostic laboratories.”40 The Security Rule divides the risks that 
threaten to exploit the vulnerabilities of HISs into three categories: 
physical, administrative, and technical.41 These risks would form the set 
Z1, . . . ,Z7 in Figure 1 above.42 For example, if ePHI were stored on a 
single computer, a physical risk would be the probability of someone 
burglarizing the computer and the data on it.43 The Security Rule 
establishes three categories of safeguards—physical, administrative, and 
technical44—which all work together to limit the probability of the 
vulnerabilities in HISs being exploited.45 
Each security standard includes a variety of implementation 
specifications, which are designated as either “required” or “addressable.”46 
Although healthcare organizations must adhere to the Security Rule’s 
standards, they are not bound to observe every single implementation 
specification described within the standards.47 Healthcare providers 
must implement the implementation specifications labeled as 
“required.” Meanwhile, implementation specifications labeled as 
“addressable” provide healthcare organizations with some discretion. 
39. See Integrating Privacy & Security Into Your Practice, HEALTH
IT,https://www.healthit.gov/providers-professionals/ehr-privacy-
security/practice-integration (last updated Apr. 13, 2015).
40. Shahidul Islam Khan, Abu Sayed & Latiful Hoque, Digital Health Data:
A Comprehensive Review of Privacy and Security Risks and Some
Recommendations, 24 COMPUTER SCI. J. OF MALDOVA 273, 274 (2016).
41. See 45 C.F.R. § 160 (2016); see also 45 C.F.R. § 164, subparts A and C
(2016) and The Security Rule, HHS.GOV https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-
professionals/security/index.html (last updated May 12, 2007).
42. See Karaseva, supra note 27, at 24 (Figure 1 above).
43. See, e.g., 45 C.F.R § 164.310(a)(1) (2016) (Physical safeguards, which
protect against physical risks, include facility access control, which implies
“policies and procedures to limit physical access to its electronic
information systems.”).
44. See Summary of the HIPAA Security Rule ,U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM.
SERV., http://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/security/laws-regulat
ions/index.html (last updated July 26, 2013) [hereinafter U.S. DEP’T OF
HEALTH & HUM. SERV.].
45. See id.
46. For Professionals: FAQ, What is the Difference Between Addressable and
Required Implementation Specifications in the Security Rule, U.S. DEP’T
OF HEALTH & HUM. SERV., https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-profession
als/faq/2020/what-is-the-difference-between-addressable-and-required-
implementation-specifications/index.html (last updated July 26, 2013).
47. See id.
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“Addressable” does not mean “optional.”48 Rather, a healthcare 
provider may assess whether the implementation specification is 
reasonable, and if not, then it is permitted to implement a more 
appropriate alternative measure than the “addressable” specification.49 
The Handbook for HIPAA-HITECH Security published by the 
American Medical Association describes “addressable” specifications as 
“situational.”50 
1. Physical Safeguards 
Physical safeguards are requirements related to “buildings and 
equipment”51 and the risks posed by “natural and environmental 
causes,” and unauthorized intrusion from unsanctioned human physical 
access.52 A crucial note here is that “data back up and storage” is 
labeled as “addressable.”53 Under this implementation specification, 
healthcare organizations should “create a retrievable, exact copy of 
electronic protected health information, when needed, before movement 
of equipment.”54 The “addressable” provisions also include facility 
security planning and access control and validation, both of which are 
promulgated with very broad regulatory language.55 
2. Administrative Safeguards 
Administrative safeguards are the “nontechnical measures that an 
organization’s management establishes regarding acceptable employee 
conduct, personnel procedures, and correct technology usage within the 
enterprise.”56 The most important standard required under the 
administrative safeguards is the security management process.57 
Organizations should assess potential risks to their data security and  
48. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERV., supra note 44. 
49. 45 C.F.R. § 164.306(d) (2016). See also 45 C.F.R. § 164.308(a)(1)(ii) 
(2016) (explaining that execution of the Security Rule is driven in large 
part by the risk analysis and management instituted in the administrative 
safeguards.). 
50. MARGARET AMATAYAKUL, HANDBOOK FOR HIPAA-HITECH SECURITY 84 
(2d ed. 2013) (“You must address these specifications, but you may do so 
according to your own situation.”). 
51. 45 C.F.R. § 164.304 (2016) (defining “physical safeguards”). 
52. Id.; see also Mike Jerbic & Stephen Wu, The Security Rule, in A GUIDE 
TO HIPAA SECURITY AND THE LAW 62 (Stephen S. Wu, ed., 2007). 
53. 45 C.F.R. § 164.310(d)(2)(iv) (2016). 
54. Id. 
55. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.310(a)(2)(ii)–(iii) (2016). 
56. Jerbic & Wu, supra note 52, at 27-28; see also 45 C.F.R. § 164.304 (2017) 
(defining “administrative safeguards”). 
57. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.308(a)(1)(i) (2016). 
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“implement security measures sufficient to reduce risks and 
vulnerabilities to a reasonable and appropriate level.”58 Two addressable 
implementation specifications under this section are “access 
authorization” and “access establishment & modification.”59 Under 
these provisions, a healthcare provider is encouraged to have in place 
policies that establish and limit the level of access to data within its 
HIS.60 Also addressable are the specifications under the category 
Security Awareness and Training.61 This means that healthcare 
providers have a lot of discretion on how they run as a top-to-bottom 
organization, including who within the organization has access to what 
within the organization’s HISs.62 Despite employee negligence being 
noted as a major contributing factor to data security problems,63 
healthcare organizations are given this broad discretion on the 
authorization-related safeguards under HIPAA. 
3. Technical Safeguards
Technical safeguards are flexible requirements for the operations of 
HISs that “store, process, or transmit ePHI.”64 Addressable safeguards 
in this section include the specification that healthcare organizations 
should “implement a mechanism to encrypt and decrypt electronic 
protected health information.”65 This provision does not provide any 
other information, including differentiating between data-at-rest and 
data-in-motion, or a minimum level of encryption.66 In other words, the 
technical safeguards mandated by HIPAA do not distinguish when data 
58. 45 C.F.R. § 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(B) (2007).
59. 45 C.F.R. § 164.308(a)(4)(ii)(B)–(C) (2007).
60. Id.
61. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.308(a)(5)(i)–(a)(5)(ii)(D) (2007).
62. See, e.g., HIPAA Security Series: Part 2, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM.
SERV., 9 (March 2007), https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/ocr/
privacy/hipaa/administrative/securityrule/adminsafeguards.pdf.
63. See Ponemon Institute, Third Annual Benchmark Study on Patient
Privacy & Data Security, 9 (2012) (the study found “insider negligence”
one of the central factors in a significant portion of data breaches); see
also Lucy L. Thomson, Health Care Data Breaches and Information
Security, in HEALTH CARE IT: THE ESSENTIAL LAWYER’S GUIDE TO
HEALTH CARE INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW 255 (Arthur
Peabody, Jr., ed., 2013) (“Responses . . . attributed [rise in data breaches]
to a lack of technologies, resources, and trained personnel.”).
64. See Jerbic & Wu, supra note 52, at 76; see also 45 C.F.R. § 164.304 (2017)
(defining “technical safeguards” as “the technology and the policy and
procedures for its use that protect electronic health information and
control access to it.”).
65. 45 C.F.R. § 164.312(a)(2)(iv) (2007).
66. Id.
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are “moving” across a network—be it private or public—and when they 
are stored in some form (or “at rest”).67 Encryption is mentioned again 
in § 312(e)(2)(ii).68 Data should be encrypted whenever the healthcare 
organization “deem[s] [it] appropriate.”69 Across the board, the required 
minimum level of technical safeguards in place to protect HISs and 
ePHI from cyber-threats are far too lax. This has inevitably led threats 
such as ransomware to wreak havoc on the healthcare industry. 
C. Ransomware 
1. Encryption 
Ransomware employs encryption to prey on unsuspecting persons. 
Encryption is “the transformation of data into a form unreadable by 
anyone without a secret decryption key.”70 The purpose of encryption 
is privacy: even someone with access to the encrypted data (“ciphertext”) 
is unable to discern the data in readable form (“plaintext”).71 There are 
two types of encryption, or cryptography: symmetric key cryptography 
and public key cryptography.72 In symmetric key cryptography, the 
sender and receiver use the same secret key to encrypt and decrypt the 
data.73 Public key cryptography uses a pair of keys: a public and a 
private key.74 The public key is shared between both parties, while both 
sender and receiver have a unique private key.75 The public key is used 
to encrypt the data, but can only be decrypted back into plaintext with 
the corresponding private key. For example: A, B, and C want to 
encrypt the messages they send amongst each other. A, B, and C’s 
public keys are openly known. A and C can encrypt a message with the 
B-public-key. Only B, however, can decrypt and read the message using 
B’s secret, private key.  
67. See Regulation and Standards: Where Encryption Applies, SANS INST., 2 
(Nov. 2007), https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/analyst
/regulations-standards-encryption-applies-34675 (“Data in transit is 
commonly delineated into two primary categories—data that is moving 
across public or ‘untrusted’ networks, such as the Internet, and data that 
is moving within the confines of private networks.”). 
68. 45 C.F.R. § 164.312(e)(2)(ii) (2007). 
69. Id. 
70. Encryption FAQ, STAN. UNIV., https://cs.stanford.edu/people/eroberts/
cs181/projects/1995-96/clipper-chip/encyptfaq.html (last accessed Mar. 
10, 2017). 
71. Id. 
72. Id. 
73. Id. (Author uses the term “secret key cryptography,” but the concepts are 
synonymous.). 
74. Id. 
75. Id. 
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Ransomware uses hybrid encryption, combining the two 
cryptographies to create an asymmetrical cryptosystem.76 In this 
cryptosystem, the public key cryptosystem is used for key encapsulation 
and a symmetric key is used for data encapsulation.77 Data is encrypted 
using a randomly-generated symmetric key.78 This symmetric key is 
subsequently encrypted using a public key where one party has the 
corresponding private key.79 The party with the private key decrypts 
the symmetric key using the private key.80 The recovered symmetric 
key can then be used to decrypt the data back into plaintext. 
2. Ransomware Attacks
Figure 2.81 
Ransomware is malware that carries out a cryptoviral extortion 
attack, in which the data of a target computer or information system 
is virtually “held hostage” until a ransom is paid. It is one of the fastest 
growing cybersecurity threats and has recently become a terror to 
healthcare providers.82 The worst part about the torrent of ransomware 
76. See Jonathan Katz, Lecture 4, Advanced Topics in Cryptography, UNIV.
MD., 4-1 (Feb. 5, 2004), available at: https://www.cs.umd.edu/~jkatz/
gradcrypto2/NOTES/lecture4.pdf.
77. See id.
78. See id.
79. Id. (“A hybrid encryption scheme uses public-key encryption to encrypt
a random symmetric key, and then proceeds to encrypt the message with
that symmetric key.”).
80. See id.
81. Krzysztof Cabaj & Wojciech Mazurczyk, Using Software-Defined Networking
for Ransomware Mitigation: The Case of Cryptowall, 30 IEEE NETWORK
14, 15 (Nov. 2016). (Figure used in authors’ explanation of ransomware
(“Symmetric (left) and asymmetric (right) crypto ransom-ware”). The
asymmetric model is more commonly used today to extort victims.).
82. See Kim Zetter, Why Hospitals are the Perfect Targets for Ransomware,
WIRED (Mar. 30, 2016), https://www.wired.com/2016/03/ransomware-
why-hospitals-are-the-perfect-targets/.
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attacks: there does not seem to be a sufficient answer to this threat.83 
In fact, the Assistant Special Agent in charge of the FBI’s Boston Cyber 
& Counterintelligence office has noted that “[t]he ransomware is that 
good.”84 In 2015, the FBI stated it may be easiest for victims of 
ransomware attacks to “just pay the ransom,” as efforts to solve the 
data-encrypting algorithms after a breach occurred were essentially 
useless.85 So, how exactly does ransomware work? 
Ransomware functions by “[p]reying on human error.”86 Cyber-
criminals who employ ransomware typically infect victims through some 
form of social engineering that lures unsuspecting victims into 
unknowingly opening their system to malware.87 The cybercriminals 
behind ransomware—often disguising their malware as something far 
less malicious—lure victims into activating the program,88 which then 
hijacks and encrypts the victim’s system.89 Methods include phishing, 
spam, drive-by-download, or any method that disguises a malware’s 
payload as a legitimate file. One example is a lawyer receiving a 
polished and well-crafted e-mail inquiring about employment at his 
firm. The e-mail included an attached resume in the form of a Microsoft 
Word document, which activated the ransomware when the lawyer 
clicked to open it.90 Ransomware may also spread on its own by using 
gaps in a computer system to access and encrypt the data without any 
interaction on the part of the victim.91 
83. Paul, FBI’s Advice on Ransomware? Just Pay the Ransom., THE SEC.
LEDGER (October 22, 2015), https://securityledger.com/2015/10/fbis-
advice-on-cryptolocker-just-pay-the-ransom/.
84. Id. (emphasis added).
85. Id.
86. Mohamad Ali, Is Your Company Ready for a Ransomware Attack?,
HARV. BUS. REV. (Oct. 3, 2016), https://hbr.org/2016/10/is-your-com
pany-ready-for-a-ransomware-attack.
87. Cabaj & Mazurczyk, supra note 81.
88. There are multiple brands of ransomware; ransomware simply refers to
the species of cyber-threat. See Ondrej Krahel, Ransomware—A Sneaky,
Dangerous Cyber Threat, CSO (Feb. 15, 2017), https://www.csoonline.
com/article/3170196/security/ransomware-is-a-sneaky-dangerous-cyber-
threat.html.
89. Ali, supra note 86.
90. Steve Strauss, Why Your Small Business Needs to Care About
Ransomware, FIGHT RANSOMWARE, https://fightransomware.com/
ransomware-articles/small-business-needs-concerned-ransomware/ (last
visited Oct. 22, 2017).
91. See Ali,supra note 86; see also Cammy Harblson, New Ransomware
Installers Can Infect Computers Without Users Clicking Anything, Say
Researchers, DIGITAL TIMES (Mar. 29, 2016), http://www.idigitaltimes
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Once a victim’s device or system has been infiltrated by the 
cybercriminal’s malware, the malware encrypts the victim’s data using 
a randomly-generated symmetric key.92 This locks the system, including 
personal cloud storage services.93 The malware uses a public key to 
encrypt the symmetric key, creating an asymmetric cryptosystem.94 A 
victim’s computer then displays a ransom message, demanding some fee 
to gain access to data. The victim pays the ransom, and sends the fee 
along with the encrypted symmetric key.95 The cybercriminal uses a 
private key to decrypt the symmetric key and sends the key back to 
the victim, who can then use it to re-gain access to their system.96 
3. The Current State of Data Security in Healthcare 
The United States is the country most widely impacted by 
ransomware attacks.97 As of 2013, data breaches in healthcare 
accounted for 45 percent of all data security breaches.98 In 2016 alone, 
healthcare data breaches comprised 35 percent of all breaches, a figure 
that the business sector has only recently eclipsed.99 In 2016, 44 perecnt 
of healthcare organizations participating in a Ponemon Institute Study 
reported that ransomware was their greatest cyber-related concern.100  
.com/new-ransomware-installers-can-infect-computers-without-users-
clicking-anything-say-522756. 
92. Cabaj & Mazurczyk, supra note 81. 
93. Ali, supra note 86. 
94. Cabaj & Mazurczyk, supra note 81. 
95. See Kevin Savage, et al., The Evolution of Ransomware, SYMANTEC 
SECURITY RESPONSE, 22–23 (Aug. 6, 2015), http://www.symantec.com/
content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/the-
evolution-of-ransomware.pdf (The payments usually go through several 
proxies and is made in the hard-to-trace currency bitcoin.). 
96. Cabaj & Mazurczyk, supra note 81. 
97. Savage et al., supra note 95, at 34 (making up 54% of all binary-based 
ransomware attacks among the world’s twelve wealthiest countries). 
98. Breaches Increase 40 Percent in 2016, Finds New Report from Identity 
Theft Resource Center and CyberScout, IDENTITY THEFT RES. CTR. (Jan. 
19, 2017), http://www.idtheftcenter.org/2016databreaches.html. 
99. Id. Although this is somewhat of an anomaly in recent years, even with 
the business industry having high profile data breach cases such as Target 
and Home Depot. See Kevin McCoy, Target to Pay $18.5M for 2013 Data 
Breach that Affected 41 Million Consumers, USA Today (May 23, 2017), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2017/05/23/target-pay-185m-
2013-data-breach-affected-consumers/102063932/; see also Jeff John 
Roberts, Home Depot to Pay Banks $25 Million in Data Breach 
Settlement, Fortune (Mar. 9, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/03/09/
home-depot-data-breach-banks/. 
100. Ponemon Institute, Sixth Annual Benchmark Study on Privacy & Security 
of Healthcare Data, 13 (May 2016). Denial of Service (DoS) attacks were 
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Documents containing the most damaging and sensitive patient 
information—medical files and billing and insurance records—were 
most likely to be successfully targeted by cybercriminals.101 Of the 
surveyed healthcare organizations, 64percent reported compromised 
medical files, and 45 percent reported breached billing and insurance 
records.102 This rate represented an increase from previous years. 
Healthcare organizations have always been particularly vulnerable, and 
security has never been more important. 
Dangers to healthcare data security come from two sources: the 
data security software design and the persons who “manipulate the 
[health IT] systems.”103 A study conducted by the Pennsylvania Patient 
Safety Authority that examined electronic health record-related 
incidents between 2004 and 2012 concluded that “[t]he majority of 
EHR-related reports involved [human error].”104 Human error, in 
particular, is a major factor in healthcare-related breaches. 
According to HHS, between 2009 and 2013, the top causes of data 
breaches affecting 500 or more individuals were: improper disposal 
(5%), hacking/IT incident (6%), loss (11%), unauthorized access (20%), 
and theft (54%).105 In 2015, breaches affecting 500 or more individuals 
totaled 253, with a loss of 112 million personal healthcare records.106 
Also, in 2015 “hacking/IT incident” and “unauthorized access” 
reported by 48% of covered entities as their greatest concern. DoS attacks 
have been used by cybercriminals in conjunction with ransomware 
breaches. See, e.g., Ricci Dipshan, Danger Ahead: 3 New Ransomware 
Developments in 2016, LAW TECH. NEWS (May 31, 2016), http://www.
legaltechnews.com/id=1202758839457/Danger-Ahead-3-New-Ransom
ware-Developments-in-2016-?slreturn=20170827111230. 
101. Ponemon Institute, supra note 100, at 21. 
102. Id. 
103. See Arthur E. Peabody Jr., Safety Risks Associated with EHRs: How 
Real?, in HEALTH CARE IT: THE ESSENTIAL LAWYER’S GUIDE TO HEALTH
CARE INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW 243-44 (2013). 
104. Erin Sparnon & William M. Marella, The Role of the Electronic Heath 
Record in Patient Safety Events, 9 Penn. Patient Safety Adv., 113, 113-
121 (Dec. 2012), http://patientsafety.pa.gov/ADVISORIES/documents
/201212_113.pdf; see also Peabody, supra note 103. 
105. MARGRET AMATAYAKUL, HANDBOOK FOR HIPAA-HITECH SECURITY 11-
12 (2d ed. 2013) (analyzing the data from U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM.
SERV., OCR, Breaches Affecting 500 or More Individuals (last visited Oct. 
29, 2016), https://ocrportal.hhs.gov/ocr/breach/breach_report.jsf. 
106. See Dan Munro, Data Breaches in Healthcare Totaled Over 112 Million 
Records in 2015, FORBES (Dec. 31, 2015), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
danmunro/2015/12/31/data-breaches-in-healthcare-total-over-112-
million-records-in-2015/#1b03d7137fd5; see also U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH
& HUM. SERV., OCR, Breaches Affecting 500 or More Individuals, supra 
note 105. 
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composed a majority of the larger security breaches.107 2016 saw a 320 
percent increase in breaches affecting 500 or more individuals caused 
by hacking/IT incidents.108 Therefore, while technology-driven breaches 
caused a significant portion of the attacks, almost all breaches were 
caused in some way by to human error.109 This indicates changes in 
mandated administrative practices may result in better data security. 
The level of compliance with security measures across the healthcare 
industry is anything but perfect. Between April 2003 and December 
2017, the Office of Civil Rights (OCR) of HHS investigated 37,023 
complaints of HIPAA violations.110 Of those investigations, 25,637 
resulted in corrective action, while the remainder found “no violation.”111 
That means the OCR found that violations existed in over 68 percent 
of the investigated complaints.112 While 37,023 is a drop in the bucket 
compared to the number of total healthcare organizations in the United 
States, the percentage of investigated organizations who were not in 
compliance is startling. The synchrony of heightened threats of 
ransomware and other data security attacks with the lack of compliance 
in the healthcare industry results in a huge potential for devastating 
consequences when data breaches do in fact occur. 
In particular, ransomware shapes a large swath of the current data 
security landscape. In 2016 alone, ransomware attacks accumulated 
approximately $1 billion in ransom payments worldwide.113 The general 
perception across the healthcare industry is that ransomware attacks 
will increase throughout 2017.114 So far, this feeling has turned out to 
be true. In May 2017, the world saw the “biggest ransomware attack in 
 
107. See Munro, supra note 106; see also Understanding the Depth of the Global 
Ransomware Problem, MALWAREBYTES, 10 (Aug. 2016), https://www.
malwarebytes.com/surveys/ransomware/?aliId=13242065. (The percent 
distribution was different, and the category of hacking/IT incident was 
split into several categories, including “e-mail phishing” and “ransomware.”). 
108. REDSPIN, Breach Report 2016: Protect Health Information (PHI), 
CYNERGISTEK 5 (Fed. 2017), https://www.redspin.com/resources/
download/breach-report-2016-protected-health-information-phi/ 
[hereinafter REDSPIN]. 
109. Id. at 17. 
110. See Numbers at a Glance, Health Information Privacy, U.S. DEP’T OF 
HEALTH & HUM. SERV.https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/
compliance-enforcement/data/numbers-glance/index.html (last updated 
July 31, 2017). 
111. Id. 
112. Id. 
113. REDSPIN, supra note 108, at 10. 
114. Id. 
Health Matrix·Volume 28·Issue 1·2018 
Health Care Held Ransom: Modifications to Data Breach Security & the 
Future of Health Care Privacy Protection 
381 
history.”115 Although the attack was widespread from Spain to Japan, 
it hit England particularly hard, where is sent the National Health 
Service (NHS) into flight or fight response.116 Hospitals and other 
healthcare organizations across London and northern England were 
forced to “revert to pen and paper” in many instances.117 Some 
organizations even had their staff using personal mobile devices in the 
place of encrypted systems.118 Now, more than ever, ransomware is a 
threat and necessitates action on the regulatory level. 
4. The Cost of Ransomware and Other Cyber-threats
Healthcare organizations are potential cash cows for cybercriminals. 
Across the healthcare industry in 2015 alone, the cost of data breaches 
was $363 per record.119 This is compared to $154 per record cost across 
all other industries.120 Indeed, the price of not protecting the data on 
HISs is steep. Over a two-year period, economic losses to healthcare 
organizations from data security breaches ranged from less than $10,000 
to well over $1 million.121 The price of data breaches has only been on 
the rise. More recently, the cost of data breaches to healthcare 
organizations has increased to $380 per record.122 Because of the 
increasing value of data, the costs of data breaches are expected to 
115. See Henry Bodkin, et al., Government Under Pressure After NHS 
Crippled in Global Cyber Attacks as Weekend of Chaos Looms, THE
TELEGRAPH (May 13, 2017), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/
05/12/nhs-hit-major-cyber-attack-hackers-demanding-ransom/. 
116. See Lily Hay Newman, The Ransomware Meltdown Experts Warned 
About is Here, WIRED (May 12, 2017), https://www.wired.com/2017/05/
ransomware-meltdown-experts-warned/. 
117. Chris Graham, NHS Cyber Attack: Everything You Need to Know About 
‘Biggest Ransomware’ Offensive in History, THE TELEGRAPH (May 20, 
2017), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/05/13/nhs-cyber-attack-
everything-need-know-biggest-ransomware-offensive/. 
118. Id. 
119. Although this is somewhat of an anomaly in recent years, even with the 
business industry having high profile data breach cases such as Target 
and Home Depot, see Khan, supra note 40, at 277 (citing the 2015 
Ponemon Institute Study on the Cost of Data Breach Comprehensive 
Study). This number was derived from the total costs of data breaches 
over the number of records compromised. 
120. Id. 
121. See Ponemon Institute, supra note 63, at 1. 
122. Elizabeth Snell, Healthcare Data Breach Costs Highest for 7th Straight 
Year, HEALTH IT SECURITY: PATIENT PRIVACY NEWS (June 20, 2017), 
https://healthitsecurity.com/news/healthcare-data-breach-costs-highest-
for-7th-straight-year. 
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quadruple by 2019 to an estimated net cost of $2 trillion.123 The costs 
for healthcare organizations goes beyond the dollar value of the EHRs 
compromised by cyber-attacks.124 There are also indirect costs attached 
to every breach, including the use of organizational resources and the 
loss of goodwill.125 
Patients suffer the most when healthcare organizations fail to 
adequately protect the sensitive information stored on their HISs. While 
patients often suffer some form of economic damage as a result of a 
data breach,126 the greater—and often harder to measure—harm is from 
having their privacy violated.127 Patients place their faith and trust in 
their healthcare providers. When this trust is broken or thrown into 
doubt because unauthorized individuals have accessed sensitive health 
information, it may be difficult to re-build. The non-monetary damage 
inflicted upon patients by data breaches is far more significant than the 
dollar value paid by healthcare organizations. Because of this, healthcare 
providers should work to their fullest extent to protect the data of their 
patients. 
D. The Problem of Outsourcing 
One problem that complicates the process of implementing 
safeguards to eliminate the risk of data security breaches is outsourcing. 
Outsourcing has been a staple across the information technology sector 
since the 1990s.128 More recently, however, the healthcare industry has 
shifted larger portions of its resources abroad through outsourcing 
initiatives.129 Doug Brown, the Managing Partner of the Black Book 
123. See Dante Disparte & Daniel Wagner, Do You Know What Your Company’s 
Data is Worth?, HARV. BUS. REV. (Sept. 16, 2016), https://hbr.org/2016/
09/do-you-know-what-your-companys-data-is-worth. 
124. See Khan, supra note 40, at 277. 
125. Id. 
126. For example, from unauthorized access to personal data, such as payment 
information (i.e. social security numbers, credit card numbers, etc.). In 
this regard, patients in healthcare data breaches suffer the same harm as 
consumers in large business data breaches. See Cord Blood Bank Settles 
FTC Charges that it Failed to Protect Consumers Sensitive Personal 
Information, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Jan. 28, 2013), https://www.ftc.gov/
news-events/press-releases/2013/01/cord-blood-bank-settles-ftc-charges-
it-failed-protect-consumers. 
127. Privacy being a fundamental right. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 
479, 485 (1965) (holding that a penumbra of privacy is created by “several 
fundamental constitutional guarantees”). 
128. Kritika Bharadwaj, How Safe is this Shore?—Data Protection and BPOs 
in India, 27 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 539, 557 (2010). 
129. See Black Book Market Research, IT Outsourcing Booms in Healthcare 
Payer Sector as Insurers Go High Tech, PR NEWSWIRE (Nov. 20, 2015), 
http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/it-outsourcing-booms-in-
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Research Group, noted: “[H]ealth insurance niche software and service 
vendors are once again offering outsourcing as a cure-all for 
organizational cost controls.”130 Business process outsourcing companies 
(BPOs) are mostly a self-regulated industry.131 While the HIPAA 
regulations offer no bright-line rule on offshoring, HIPAA is clear on 
the rules regarding business associates.132 A business associate is a 
person or entity that “performs certain functions or activities that 
involve the use or disclosure of protected health information on behalf 
of, or provides services to, a covered entity.”133 But how does a 
healthcare provider ensure that offshore business associates are 
adequately protecting the ePHI of their patients? 
III. Recommendations
Healthcare data security is clearly lacking. Despite the strides made 
by HIPAA thus far, it is far from perfect. This Part offers three primary 
modifications to HIPAA that would better protect patient ePHI stored 
on HISs while remaining scalable and flexible for the broad spectrum of 
healthcare organizations. This Part also briefly addresses the issues 
posed by outsourcing healthcare IT. Section III.A of this Note proposes 
mandating stricter technical safeguards for the protection of patient 
data. Section III.B offers a clearer and simplified guideline for 
compliance that incorporates industry best practices. Section III.C 
provides a framework that categorizes risks, which healthcare 
organizations would use to analyze the extent of the security measures 
they should reasonably use to maintain the flexibility that is central to 
HIPAA. 
A. Mandate Stricter Technical Requirements 
The technical safeguards provided by HIPAA are broad and fail to 
provide a clear guideline of what technical protections would be 
sufficient and what, at a minimum, should be required.134 Encryption, 
healthcare-payer-sector-as-insurers-go-high-tech-new-black-book-survey-
300182354.html (finding that many health plans are budgeting at least 
20% increases in outsourcing spends). 
130. Id. 
131. Bharadwaj, supra note 128, at 560. 
132. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(e) (2007) (disclosures to business associates); see 
also 45 C.F.R. § 164.504(e) (2007) (requirements for business associate 
contracts). 
133. Business Associates, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERV. https://www.hhs
.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/privacy/guidance/business-associates/
index.html (last updated Apr. 3, 2003). 
134. See45 C.F.R. § 164.312 (2007) (listing all technical safeguards promul-
gated under the Security Rule). 
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for example, should be used whenever a healthcare organization deems 
it “appropriate.”135 The Security Rule mandates that healthcare org-
anizations “[i]mplement technical security measures to guard against 
unauthorized access to electronic protected health information that is 
being transmitted over an electronic communications network.”136 Not 
only is this extremely broad with little explanation, but it also only 
focuses on ePHI “being transmitted over an electronic communications 
network.”137 HIPAA does not mention electronic data storage 
standards.138 A handful of specific, stricter technical safeguards would 
better protect patient data. 
1. Require a 3-2-1 Rule for Data Backup 
First, the Security Rule should be modified to better protect data 
through more efficient and stringent storage and backup requirements. 
Ideally, data backup plans should accomplish three things: (1) 
periodically and consistently backup data; (2) take special care 
regarding where the backup data is stored; and (3) avoid relying solely 
on online backup.139 Requiring healthcare organizations to implement a 
3-2-1 Rule for storing all ePHI would be ideal for achieving these 
objectives.140 A 3-2-1 Rule is defined as a healthcare organization having 
“three copies of data, on two different types of media, with one of those 
copies being off site.”141 One of the types of media healthcare organizations 
should use must be external and offline. In addition to implementing a 
3-2-1 Rule, healthcare organizations should be required to perform 
continuous data backup and recovery tests.142 This would ensure that 
all copies of ePHI are up-to-date and that healthcare providers can be 
confident in their recovery systems.143 HIPAA’s Security Rule would 
benefit from requiring this data storage behavior in all healthcare 
organizations. 
 
135. 45 C.F.R. § 164.312(e)(2)(ii) (2007). 
136. 45 C.F.R. § 164.312(e)(1) (2007). 
137. Id. 
138. See generally 45 C.F.R. § 164.312 (2007). 
139. Marion K. Jenkins, The Top 5 Benefits of the HIPAA Security Rule, 
PHYSICIANS PRACTICE (Mar. 30, 2011), http://www.physicianspractice
.com/healthcare-careers/top-5-benefits-hipaa-security-rule. 
140. See Dipshan, supra note 100. 
141. Id. (emphasis added). 
142. See id. 
143. This will also important for already required provisions under the Security 
Rule’s technical safeguards. For example, when a healthcare provider 
must access ePHI for an emergency under 160.312(a)(2)(ii) (2016). 
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This specific modification does not protect healthcare organizations 
by preventing ransomware attacks and other cybersecurity risks. What 
this data storage and backup behavior does is mitigate any damage to 
the healthcare provider caused by these types of attacks. Ransomware 
uses denial of access to important data as leverage to extort healthcare 
organizations.144 Often times, the data held hostage is important to the 
healthcare provider’s function in aiding its patients. For example, the 
data may include patient medical history and charts. Without it, 
doctors may not be able to adequately provide service to a patient. 
Following a ransomware attack, if healthcare organizations are able to 
address the cybercriminal’s access point to their HIS, and then access 
the data that was held hostage, then they would no longer be pressured 
to pay the ransom. Healthcare organizations could instead take time to 
further analyze the situation and how to address the problem. If the 
organization properly addresses the access point the criminal used to 
encrypt the ePHI, then it may be assumed that the criminals no longer 
have access to the data. The healthcare organization would still, however, 
have to bear some cost in properly destroying the copy of the data that 
was encrypted by the cybercriminal if they cannot decrypt it without 
paying the ransom.145 
2. Encryption
At a minimum, all healthcare organizations should be required to 
implement some level of encryption for highly sensitive ePHI. A simple 
symmetric key encryption should be used by all healthcare providers 
for all ePHI. Of course, if after performing the security management 
process, a healthcare organization discerns that its HIS contains a large 
store of patient ePHI, it may decide to use a public key encryption 
system or a hybrid encryption.146 This would be more likely for larger 
healthcare systems, as opposed to smaller practices.147 In conjunction 
144. Kim Zetter, What is Ransomware? A Guide to the Global Cyberattack’s 
Scary Method, THE WIRE (May 14, 2017), https://www.wired.com/
2017/05/hacker-lexicon-guide-ransomware-scary-hack-thats-rise/ 
(“Ransomware is malware that locks your keyboard or computer to 
prevent you from accessing your data until you pay a ransom . . . ”). 
145. This may, or may not, be cheaper than the ransom demanded by the 
cybercriminal. That estimation would be on a case-by-case basis. Not 
paying the ransom, however, has the benefit of deterring the behavior of 
cybercriminals by not rewarding the criminal activity. See Ransomware: 
Should You Pay the Ransom?, EY ADVISORY (2016), https://advisory
.ey.com/cybersecurity/should-you-pay-the-ransom. 
146. See Katz, supra note 76, at 4-1. 
147. Simply because larger healthcare systems, on the whole, have more 
resources and therefore a more sophisticated technology infrastructure. 
See Olin Bay, Health Care Information Technology: A Key to Quality and 
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with requiring encryption, the physical safeguards should be modified 
to mandate strict control of who within a healthcare organization has 
access to the key(s).148 Only those that absolutely require access to 
patient ePHI should have access to the key(s). This may also be helpful 
when sending ePHI within a network from one organization member to 
another through the use of a public key encryption system. Finally, one 
thing all healthcare organizations should be required to do is to 
occasionally re-encrypt ePHI.149 Each healthcare organization may 
analyze their needs and the risks involved to decide how frequently this 
is done, but creating new key pairs should be done at least every five 
years. 
Encryption comes with several potential challenges. What if a 
malicious employee with access to a key is terminated? Must a healthcare 
organization pay for revoking the key and ciphertext to re-encrypt the 
ePHI? What about cloud storage—where data is stored in logical pools 
as opposed to on physical devices—which is increasingly used in the 
healthcare industry?150 Access control is a major issue, both inside and 
outside the growing field of cloud data storage.151 One developing solution 
is self-updatable encryption, in which the ciphertext and a private key 
are directly correlated to a period of time.152 A person within an 
organization may then be able to decipher data only within the time limit 
 
Cost Issues, LEAGUE WOMEN’S VOTERS (2010), http://www.montrose
.co.lwvnet.org/files/hcet_bp_healthcareinfotech.pdf. 
148. See generally 45 C.F.R. § 164.310 (2007) (physical safeguards control 
personnel access to facilities and workstations, an addition can be made 
that functions very similarly for decryption keys). 
149. This is fairly easy to do. Take, for example, re-encryption and key rotation 
for Google’s Cloud KMS. See, e.g., Key rotation, GOOGLE CLOUD 
PLATFORM, https://cloud.google.com/kms/docs/key-rotation (last updated 
June 26, 2017) (showing re-encryption and key rotation for Google’s Cloud 
KMS). See also Re-encrypting Data, GOOGLE CLOUD PLATFORM, 
https://cloud.google.com/kms/docs/re-encrypt-data (explaining that 
the process for re-encrypting data is fairly straightforward and involves 
decrypting the data, using a new primary key to re-encrypt the data, and 
then disposing of the prior used key). 
150. See Iron Mountain, Cloud Data Storage: Why Healthcare Organizations 
are Taking Notice, IRON MOUNTAIN KNOWLEDGE CTR., http://www.
ironmountain.com/Knowledge-Center/Reference-Library/View-by-
Document-Type/General-Articles/C/Cloud-Data-Storage-Why-
Healthcare-Organizations-Are-Taking-Notice.aspx (last accessed Mar. 4, 
2017) (“Nearly one-third [73%] of healthcare decision makers said they 
are using cloud applications”). 
151. See Kwangsu Lee, et al., Self-updatable Encryption: Time Constrained 
Access Control with Hidden Attributes and Better Efficiency, 667 
THEORETICAL COMPUTER SCIENCE 51, 52 (2017). 
152. Id. at 52 
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that their key works.153 This type of encryption system may also provide 
cloud data servers with a comforting level of access control and 
security.154 
Encryption, much like mandating a 3-2-1 Rule, does not directly 
prevent ransomware attacks. It primarily protects patients by making 
any ePHI a cybercriminal may access indecipherable, and thus 
incapable of being used to harm patients. Unlike the 3-2-1 Rule, 
encryption and its strategic use may limit the risk of cybersecurity 
breaches by limiting the flaws in the protections of HISs. An encrypted 
HIS is less likely to fall victim to non-technical methods of penetration, 
such as breaches resulting from human error or deviance.155 Encryption 
may also deter cybercriminals across the board, as the data has little 
value if it is in indecipherable ciphertext.156 
3. Data-at-rest v. Data-in-motion
HIPAA should provide differentiated requirements for data-at-rest 
and data-in-motion. Data-at-rest means data that is stored in some 
static form.157 For example, the data in file systems and databases are 
data-at-rest.158 Data-in-motion means data “as it moves through the 
network to the outside world.”159 Data that is in transit via e-mail, 
messaging software, peer-to-peer (P2P) networks, or any similar 
mechanisms are examples of data-in-motion.160 To adequately protect 
sensitive data, data-at-rest must be treated differently from data-in-
motion.161 The safeguards this Note proposes for data-at-rest generally 
involves software protections and cyber hygiene. On the other hand, 
data-in-motion requires a level of authentication. Both types of data 
should be encrypted. 
153. Id. at 57. 
154. Id. at 51. 
155. See Robert Lemos, Use Data Encryption to Safeguard your Data, PC
WORLD (Nov. 13, 2008), http://www.pcworld.com/article/153826/data_
encryption_tools.html. 
156. Id. 
157. See Simon Liu & Rick Kuhn, Data Loss Prevention, 12 IT PROFESSIONAL 
10, 11 11 (2010), http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/SNS/rbac/documents/data-
loss.pdf. 
158. Id. 
159. Id. at 12. 
160. Id. 
161. Id. (“Data in each state often requires different techniques for loss 
prevention. For example, although deep content inspection is useful for 
data in motion, it doesn’t help so much for data at rest.”). 
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HIPAA should require a minimum level of organizational cyber 
hygiene and resilience.162 HIPAA should explicitly require that 
organizations implement endpoint security protections, intrusion-
prevention software, and web browser protection for all devices with 
accessibility to both an HIS and the internet. Further, it should require 
that all healthcare organizations update their software. The period of 
time between software updates should be, at a minimum, weekly, 
though healthcare organizations may determine this need on a case-by-
case basis. HIPAA should also be modified to require penetration 
testing. This means that an IT security company evaluates the security 
of an organization’s security infrastructure.163 These tests highlight 
vulnerabilities not only in protective software, but in system 
configuration and end-user behavior.164 The frequency and extent of 
these penetration tests would depend on the size and capabilities of the 
healthcare organization.165 Organizations would determine this after 
performing their own risk assessments. 
Healthcare organizations should also take measures to secure ePHI 
that is in motion, either across a HIS or that is travelling to an external 
location. While the most effective method of protection is encryption, 
there are other steps that healthcare organizations could and should 
take. HIPAA should mandate that healthcare organizations implement 
technical policies and procedures for both data-in-motion and data-at-
rest. As an addressable implementation specification, HIPAA should 
require that healthcare organizations use both authentication and a 
virtual private network (VPN). Authentication would ensure that all 
data being sent and received is either going to or coming from a trusted 
source.166 This would prevent many of the tactics cybercriminals use to 
infiltrate HISs and begin ransomware schemes.167 All ePHI sent from a 
 
162. The concept of cyber hygiene refers to the responsibility of individuals to 
maintain the “health” of the user’s system. It is centered on routine and 
contributes on a organizational level to cybersecurity. See Floyd 
McKinney, Fight Security Decay; Cyber Hygiene, ENGILITY (Sept. 17 
2017), https://www.engilitycorp.com/blog/article/fight-security-decay-
practice-good-cyber-hygiene. 
163. See What is Penetration Testing?, CORE SECURITY, https://www.core
security.com/penetration-testing-overview (last visited Oct. 22, 2017). 
164. Id. 
165. Frequently Asked Questions, HALOCK SECURITY LABS, https://www.hal
ock.com/frequently-asked-questions-pages-357.php (last visited Oct. 23, 
2017). 
166. See, e.g., Lily Hay Newman, If You Want a VPN to Protect Your Privacy, 
Start Here, WIRED (Mar. 30, 2017), https://www.wired.com/2017/
03/want-use-vpn-protect-privacy-start/ 
167. Because VPNs secure peer-to-peer networks, this method would limit 
phishing e-mails that appear to come from an internal source (and thus 
more likely to be opened by the victim). 7 Steps to Protect Yourself 
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secured network environment should only be received through the use 
of a VPN because a VPN creates “a secure connection even on a public 
unsecured network.”168 This is a particularly important option for 
mobile devices used to access or transmit ePHI.169 Requiring healthcare 
organizations to implement or consider implementing some form of 
these measures would protect patient ePHI from ransomware and other 
cybersecurity attacks. 
4. Prohibit Use of Generic Usernames
The Security Rule’s technical safeguards require healthcare 
organizations to “[a]ssign a unique name and/or number for identifying 
and tracking user identity.”170 This, unfortunately, is not enough. This 
provision should be modified to explicitly prohibit the use of generic 
passwords for any device or workstation operated by a healthcare 
organization. Also, there should either be a prohibition against 
commonly shared work stations, or at the very least strict controls 
regarding these workstations. The Recommended HIPAA Security 
Standards developed by the University of South Florida’s (USF) 
HIPAA Security Team, for example, provides a more stringent version 
of the Unique User Identification Standard.171 
USF’s recommended standard prohibits both generic usernames 
and passwords. Furthermore, their recommended standard explicitly 
sets a minimum quality requirement for passwords.172 Under their recom-
mended standard: “Passwords are to consist of at least six characters, and 
should include alpha, numeric, and special characters in order to prevent 
unauthorized password use or password guessing.”173 This standard, or 
something similar to it, should be required to prevent blunt force breach 
attempts. USF’s standard, unlike the one currently promulgated by 
HIPAA, also addresses common work stations.174 Where multiple users 
Against Corporate Spear Phishing, LINOMA SOFTWARE (June 28, 2017), 
https://www.goanywhere.com/blog/2017/06/28/7-steps-to-protect-
yourself-against-corporate-spear-phishing. 
168. See Use Adequate Security to Send or Receive Health Information Over 
Public Wi-fi Networks, HEALTH IT, https://www.healthit.gov/providers-
professionals/10-use-adequate-security-send-or-receive-health-
information-over-public-wi-f (last updated Mar. 21, 2014). 
169. Id. 
170. 45 C.F.R. § 164.312(a)(2)(i) (2007). 
171. See HIPAA Security Rule Safeguards Recommended Standards, UNIV. S.
FL. (May 12, 2005), http://health.usf.edu/nr/rdonlyres/2d58eb73-e08a-
4ede-b3bf-2ef77a4ad70c/0/usfhipaasecurityrulestandards.pdf. 
172. Id. at 8. 
173. Id. (emphasis added). 
174. Id. 
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are required to have access to one workstation, USF still requires 
stringent access to the individual applications on the workstation.175 
USF’s recommended standards for user identification are a great 
example of what HIPAA should require of all healthcare organizations. 
Heightened access standards like these should be paired with personnel 
limitations on access to certain parts of HISs to generally protect 
against negligently introducing malware and cybersecurity attacks, 
including ransomware. 
5. Require Access-Triggered Breach Notification
Under HIPAA’s Breach Notification Rules, healthcare providers are 
required to notify individuals “whose [ePHI] has been, or is reasonably 
believed . . . to have been accessed, acquired, used, or disclosed as a 
result of such breach.”176 This seems sufficient on its face. Unfortunately, 
under the same rule, unauthorized access is not a breach if a healthcare 
provider determines “that there is a low probability that the protected 
health information has been compromised based on a risk assessment.”177 
The factors of the risk assessment include “whether the [ePHI] was 
actually acquired or viewed.”178 As a result, cybersecurity breaches such 
as ransomware attacks, where the data is encrypted, would not trigger 
notification to individuals. Therefore, despite the organization’s HIS 
being penetrated and the data being “accessed” by an unauthorized 
person, patients are left in the dark about whether their ePHI is 
involved or not. 
HIPAA’s data breach notification should be revised to replace the 
“risk assessment” with an automatic access-based trigger. This means 
that notification would be triggered “whenever personal data is 
reasonably believed to have been acquired by an unauthorized person 
and require no evidence that an unauthorized person actually acquired 
the data.”179 A ransomware attack and similar breaches should then 
satisfy this requirement. Transparency is important and therefore 
whenever there is a reasonable belief of unauthorized access, patients 
should be kept informed of potential risks involving their sensitive 
personal information. 
An argument against such a modification is that patients would be 
overwhelmed with notifications and de-sensitized to the notices that 
175. See id. 
176. 45 C.F.R. § 164.404(a)(1) (2016). 
177. 45 C.F.R. § 164.402(2) (2016). 
178. Id. 
179. Stanley C. Ball, Note, Ohio’s “Aggressive” Attack on Medical Identity 
Theft, 24 J.L & HEALTH 111, 138 (2011) (The student-author in this Note 
focuses on state law in the context of medical identity theft, the definition 
used is nevertheless helpful here.). 
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healthcare organizations send out.180 This is problematic if patients are 
unable to decipher when a breach is particularly important (i.e. when 
their personal data has actually been acquired and the risk of medical 
or financial identity theft is realistic). First, if data stored in HISs are 
properly encrypted, then that eliminates the need to not provide notice 
at all. This is because breaches under HIPAA only involve unsecured 
ePHI.181 Through the use of encryption, the data are rendered unusable, 
unreadable, and indecipherable.182 Second, to further address this issue, 
the type of notice provided should be based on a factor-based risk 
analysis. Currently, HIPAA requires written notice for individual 
notification.183 Without actual proof of access or acquisition of data, the 
form of notice should be online and easily accessible to patients. 
Patients should, however, be occasionally reminded of the existence of 
these postings. For breaches where individuals’ data are acquired by 
unauthorized persons, written notice should be provided as it is 
currently laid out in the federal regulations.184 
B. Provide Clearer & Simplified Compliance Guidelines 
In their 2007 article, Professors Sharona Hoffman and Andy 
Podgurski argue in part that one of the flaws of HIPAA’s Security Rule 
is that, in providing covered entities with flexibility and discretion, the 
Rule fails to provide adequate guidance on how the covered entities 
should comply with the requirements.185 The authors also contend that 
“some organizations could use the regulations’ vagueness as a 
justification for establishing minimal PHI security measures.”186 Finally, 
 
180. See Experts Forecast Top Seven Trends in Healtcare Information Privacy 
for 2011, IDEXPERTS (Jan. 05, 2011), https://www2.idexpertscorp
.com/knowledge-center//single/experts-forecast-top-seven-trends-in-
healthcare-information-privacy-fo . Or this leaves patients simply terrified 
all the time. See Asha Saxena, 6 Ways Hospitals Can Ease Patients Fears 
About Security Threats, BECKER’S HEALTH IT & CIO REVIEW (May 26, 
2015), https://www.beckershospitalreview.com/healthcare-information-
technology/6-ways-hospitals-can-ease-patients-fears-about-security-
threats.html. 
181. 45 C.F.R. § 164.404(a)(1) (2016) (“A covered entity shall, following the 
discovery of a breach of unsecured protected health information . . . ”) 
(emphasis added). 
182. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.402 (2016) (defining “unsecured protected health 
information”). 
183. 45 C.F.R. § 164.404(d)(1) (2016). 
184. See, e.g., id. 
185. Sharona Hoffman & Andy Podgurski, In Sickness, Health, and 
Cyberspace: Protecting the Security of Electronic Private Health 
Information, 48 BOS.C. L. REV. 331, 350-51 (2007). 
186. Id. at 351. 
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they point out that the Security Rule does not require that healthcare 
organizations rely on the “best current security practices” of the data 
security community.187 One of the “reputable organizations” that the 
authors recognize as a potential basis for “best practices” in complying 
with HIPAA Security is the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (NIST).188 
HHS should officially adopt NIST’s data security standards as best 
practice for the entire healthcare industry. NIST and HHS already have 
a long history of working closely together, so promoting NIST in the 
federal regulations would not be a sweeping change.189 Healthcare 
organizations should be required to perform their risk assessments in 
light of the standards promoted and drafted by NIST. For example, 
healthcare organizations should refer to the NIST risk management 
framework (RMF).190 The RMF provides a “disciplined, structured, 
extensible, and repeatable process for achieving risk-based protection 
related to the operation and use of information systems.”191 All 
healthcare organizations should follow and apply the RMF when 
complying with the Security Rule. 
187. Id. at 252–3. 
188. Id. 
189. See, e.g., Addressing Gaps in Cybersecurity: OCR Releases Crosswalk 
Between HIPAA Security Rule and NIST Cybersecurity Framework, U.S.
DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-
professionals/security/nist-security-hipaa-crosswalk/index.html?language
=es (last updated Feb. 23, 2006). The “crosswalk” identifies points of 
interaction between the Security Rule and NIST Framework, as well as 
other widely known security frameworks. 
190. See NATL’ INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS & TECH., U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, 
SP 800-66 REV. 1, AN INTRODUCTORY RESOURCE GUIDE FOR IMPLEMENTING
THE HEALTH INSURANCE PORTABILITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY ACT
(HIPAA) SECURITY RULE, 10 (Oct. 2008), available at: https://www.hhs
.gov/sites/default/files/ocr/privacy/hipaa/administrative/securityrule/n
ist80066.pdf [hereinafter Scholl]. 
191. Id.; see also Figure 3. 
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192
Figure 3.193 
As NIST has pointed out, the RMF overlaps with the 
implementation standards promulgated under the Security Rule. The 
six steps distill much of the spirit of the Security Rule into an easy to 
follow process. In conjunction with the six-step RMF, NIST has also 
provided questions to help guide compliance with the Security Rule’s 
three general safeguards.194 Providing an explicitly adopted best 
practice standard for complying with the Security Rule helps 
ensure that healthcare organizations implement sufficient measures to 
protect against cybersecurity threats, including ransomware. 
C. A Flexible Administrative Standard 
One of HIPAA’s policy goals was to provide healthcare organizations 
with flexibility and discretion in applying it’s mandates.195 A small-
town private practice with a single physician, for example, would not 
apply the same level of security measures as a national hospital 
network. Along with using NIST as an understandable basis for 
complying with HIPAA, the flexibility standard should be revised so 
that healthcare organizations may retain flexibility but do not have 
too much discretion as to apply minimal standards in some cases. 
192. Scholl, supra note 190, at 11 (“Many Security Rule standards and 
implementation specifications correspond to the steps of the NIST RMF.”). 
193. Id. at 11. (showing a visual portrayal of the NIST Risk Management 
Framework.). 
194. See id. at17–53. 
195. See 45 C.F.R.§ 164.306(b) (2016) (flexibility of approach). 
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There are many registers of information technology security 
threats.196 HHS should develop and maintain a similar database that 
documents cyber-threats to e-PHI and HISs, borrowing from already 
existing registers while contributing healthcare-specific threats. These 
threats should be categorized into three risk groups: known, semi-
known, and unknown.197 Known threats are those that are clearly 
known and can easily be addressed through implementing clearly 
defined technical safeguards.198 These threats include malware that has 
been identified, is widely known, and up-to-date endpoint protection 
software would adequately protect against. 
Semi-known threats are threats that “the cybersecurity industry 
has already identified [many of the risks for and] . . . best practices for 
addressing them.”199 Unlike known threats, there is no clear solution to 
semi-known threats and best practices to address related risks are not 
commonly implemented throughout the industry. These threats include 
ransomware. For example, there is no common solution to ransomware 
once an organization’s data is encrypted. While broadly accepted 
preventative measures are promoted by experts, there is no clear 
solution to thwarting ransomware. Also, healthcare organizations must 
still calculate the “likelihood and magnitude” of these types of 
threats.200 All healthcare organizations should protect themselves 
against known threats, and in some way address semi-known threats. 
Finally, only healthcare organizations with sizeable HISs and 
mature, well-developed security capabilities and culture should in any 
way address unknown threats. Unknown threats “represent failures of 
imagination.”201 Therefore, only organizations with a developed 
technology infrastructure have the luxury, time, and resources for dealing 
with this kind of non-immanent threat. The few, capable organizations 
should make habitual inquiries into cybersecurity and address potential, 
yet-to-be identified threats by foreseeing potential liabilities in their use 
 
196. See, e.g., Security Response Center, SYMANTEC https://www.symantec
.com/security_response/ (last visited Oct. 22, 2017) (Symantec lists and 
categorizes every cyber-threat and continually updates this list). 
197. See Noah G. Susskind, Note, Cybersecurity Compliance and Risk 
Management Strategies: What Directors, Officers, and Managers Need to 
Know, 11 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 573 (2015). This tripartite structure was 
influenced by a similar idea proffered by the student-author here. Unlike 
this Note, however, this author focuses on the financial industry and 
corporate governance and management, where I apply a similar idea to 
the healthcare industry and HIPAA. The idea of applying this tripartite 
to a register of threats is also unique to this Note. 
198. Id. 
199. Id. at 601. 
200. Id. 
201. Id. at 618. 
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of IT in relation to their HISs. This tripartite structure for flexibility in 
administering security safeguards strikes a balance between allowing 
healthcare providers to have discretion and more stringently protecting 
patient ePHI. 
D. Addressing the Outsourcing Problem 
If a large-scale data breach involving ePHI were to happen offshore 
where a vendor performs outsourced services, it is unclear what the 
ability of HHS would be to enforce HIPAA against the offshore org-
anization. Currently, HIPAA mandates what disclosures a covered entity 
may make to business associates (BAs) and what disclosures BAs may 
in turn make.202 It does not, however, clearly identify offshore service 
providers as BAs. Kirk Nahra, chair of Wiley Rein LLP’s Privacy 
Practice, when asked about whether offshore vendors constitute 
business associates under HIPAA, had to say, “HIPAA doesn’t say a 
word about offshore. But a BA is a BA is a BA.”203 On the bright side, 
India’s laws and self-regulation standards are comforting for any person 
worried about the security of ePHI handled by offshore vendors located 
in the country.204 The India Information Technology Act of 2008, 
modified in 2011 by the Information Technology Rules, mandates strict 
requirements for the privacy of sensitive data.205 These rules include the 
requirement that organizations collecting personal data “must have in 
place reasonable security practices and procedures.”206 Indeed, it is 
likely that many offshore vendors “with a history of dealing with U.S. 
health-care clients—are as good or better than U.S. companies at 
protecting data.”207 Still, HIPAA should be further modified to include 
vetting criteria for covered healthcare organizations thinking of 
outsourcing services overseas.208 
 
202. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(e) (2016). 
203. Kirk Nahra Discusses HIPAA Compliance Questions Involving Offshore 
Vendors, WILEY REIN LLP (Aug. 14, 2013), http://www.wileyrein.com/
newsroom-media-992.html [hereinafter Wiley Rein]. 
204. See Todd B. Ruback & Sarah Mahony, An Overview of Recent Statutory 
Changes to Privacy Law in India in Comparison to Similar U.S. and EU 
Privacy Rules, 2011 N.J. LAW. 38, 40 (2011). 
205. Id. 
206. Id. 
207. See Wiley Rein, supra note 203 (quoting Kirk Nahra). 
208. I leave this proposition with the question. While I do not believe 
outsourcing is a major issue for this topic as of now, I do think this 
proposal is one worth more thought. For the sake of brevity, however, I 
will save it for later discussion. See generally, After OCR Probe of Stolen 
Flash Drive, Hospital Is Not Fined; Upgrade Was Under Way, REP. ON 
MEDICARE COMPLIANCE (Feb. 27, 2017), https://www.kslaw.com/
attachments/000/004/735/original/rmc_feb_27-2.pdf?1499727809. 
Health Matrix·Volume 28·Issue 1·2018 
Health Care Held Ransom: Modifications to Data Breach Security & the 
Future of Health Care Privacy Protection 
396 
IV. The Federal Trade Commission 
Even if HIPAA is not modified, the practices proposed in this Note 
should be adopted by all healthcare organizations as industry best 
practices. Healthcare organizations should adopt these proposals 
because inadequately safeguarding patient data despite clear evidence 
of cyber-threats across the industry may mean liability for unfair 
practices towards their patients. This Part explains the recently 
developing history of Federal Trade Commission (FTC) enforcement of 
data security practices and the FTC’s authority over this subject 
matter. In the most recent case of LabMD, the FTC developed a legal 
framework for liability that makes many healthcare organizations liable 
for poor data security practices, even when no actual harm occurs to 
their patients as a result. The FTC’s recent actions afford a strong 
impetus for healthcare providers to make these proposed modifications. 
A. FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp. 
The FTC has played a strong role in enforcing cybersecurity cases 
since the early 2000s. On January 31, 2014, the FTC announced the 
milestone of its fiftieth data security settlement.209 The FTC further 
solidified its position as the authority of the data security field by 
releasing its own guidance on the subject.210 The FTC’s enforcement 
was challenged and affirmed in the case FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide 
Corp..211 There, Wyndham challenged the FTC’s statutory authority to 
regulate data security practices after the FTC filed suit against 
Wyndham alleging unfair and deceptive practices for data breaches 
occurring between 2008 and 2014.212 The district court found for the 
FTC, holding that it possessed the requisite authority to enforce data 
security claims.213 
The data breaches resulted in hackers obtaining payment 
information—including credit card numbers and security codes—of over 
600,000 consumers, resulting in $10.6 million in fraud loss.214 The 
hackers infiltrated property management systems that process 
 
209. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, COMMISSION STATEMENT MARKING THE FTC’S 
50TH DATA SECURITY SETTLEMENT (Jan. 31, 2014), https://www.ftc.gov/
system/files/documents/cases/140131gmrstatement.pdf. 
210. FED. TRADE COMM’N, INTERNET OF THINGS: PRIVACY & SECURITY IN A 
CONNECTED WORLD (Jan. 2015), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/
documents/reports/federal-trade-commission-staff-report-november-
2013-workshop-entitled-internet-things-privacy/150127iotrpt.pdf. 
211. FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d 236 (3d Cir. 2015). 
212. See id. at 241. 
213. Id. at 631. 
214. Wyndham Worldwide Corp.,799 F.3d at 242. 
Health Matrix·Volume 28·Issue 1·2018 
Health Care Held Ransom: Modifications to Data Breach Security & the 
Future of Health Care Privacy Protection 
397 
consumer information that Wyndham managed.215 The FTC alleged 
that as far back as 2008, Wyndham managed these systems in a manner 
that “taken together, unreasonably and unnecessarily exposed consumers’ 
personal data to unauthorized access and theft.”216 This included: (1) 
storing payment information in clear, readable text; (2) using “easily 
guessed” passwords to secure the management systems; (3) allowing the 
management systems to connect to Wyndham’s entire network without 
appropriate technical precautions217; (4) failing to “adequately restrict” 
the access of third-party vendors to the network; and (5) not following 
proper procedure or conducting an investigation following a security 
breach.218 
The Federal Trade Commission Act (FTC Act) prohibits “[u]nfair 
methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or 
deceptive practices in or affecting commerce.”219 The U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Third Circuit pointed out that Congress designed the 
term “unfair methods of competition” as a flexible concept and left its 
development to the FTC.220 The FTC provided guidance on factors 
governing unfairness determinations, which the Supreme Court later 
adopted: 
(1) whether the practice, without necessarily having been 
previously considered unlawful, offends public policy . . . whether, 
in other words, it is within at least the penumbra of some 
common-law, statutory, or other established concept of unfairness; 
(2) whether it is immoral, unethical, oppressive, or unscrupulous; 
and 
(3) whether it causes substantial injury to consumers.221 
 
215. Id. at 241. 
216. Id. at 240. 
217. For example, Wyndham allowed at least one hotel to connect to its system 
with a security system that had not been updated in three years. 
Wyndham also permitted connection with the use of default usernames 
and passwords. 
218. Wyndham Worldwide Corp.,799 F.3d at 240–241. 
219. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2006); see also 15 U.S.C. § 45(n) (2006) (“The 
Commission shall have no authority under this section . . . to declare 
unlawful an act or practice on the grounds that such act or practice is 
unfair unless the act or practice causes or is likely to cause substantial 
injury to consumers which is not reasonably avoidable by consumers 
themselves.”). 
220. Wyndham Worldwide Corp.,799 F.3d at 243. 
221. Id. 
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The appellate court affirmed the district court’s decision.222 
Wyndham also argued that the FTC’s claim should fail because its 
conduct was not unethical or unscrupulous, and because a business 
“does not treat its customers in an ‘unfair’ manner when the business 
‘itself’ is victimized by criminals.”223 The court rejected both arguments, 
holding that unfairness claims may be brought on likely rather than 
actual injury.224 
B. In re LabMD 
The FTC’s authority in the realm of data security was extended in 
the case of LabMD. In July 2016, the FTC heard a case regarding the 
negligent handling of sensitive patient information by a medical testing 
company.225 LabMD—the company in question—provided management 
employees with administrative rights over their workstations (i.e. control 
over their workstation’s operating system), including sales employees.226 
Around 2005, LabMD’s billing manager and others in the department 
accidentally exposed files containing sensitive patient data to a P2P 
file-sharing program.227 Later, unauthorized persons accessed a file 
containing these sensitive health data, which included names and social 
security numbers of 600 patients.228 
The FTC overturned an administrative law judge (ALJ)’s ruling 
where the ALJ defined the phrase “‘likely to cause [substantial injury]’” 
to mean “‘having a high probability of occurring or being true.’”229 The 
ALJ also held that the unauthorized exposure of sensitive medical data, 
without an accompanying tangible injury, fell outside the scope of 
“substantial injury” under the FTC Act.230 Looking to the Wyndham 
Worldwide three-part test, the FTC found that LabMD failed to: 
protect its computer network with even the most fundamental cyber 
hygiene practices; provide data security training to its employees; and 
restrict or monitor the computer practices of persons using its 
network.231 
 
222. Id. at 259. 
223. Id. at 246. 
224. Id. 
225. See In the Matter of LabMD, Inc., 2016 FTC LEXIS 128 *1 (F.T.C. July 
28, 2016) 
226. Id. at *4–5. 
227. A P2P file-sharing program is one that allows the sharing of media files 
through the use of a peer-to-peer network., id. at *5. 
228. Id. at *11. 
229. Id. at *56. 
230. In the Matter of LabMD, Inc., 2016 FTC LEXIS at *19. 
231. See id. at*9–10. 
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The panel of commissioners of the FTC held that the FTC could 
act preemptively and without a showing of tangible harm.232 The FTC 
also found that while cases of unfairness usually involve tangible, 
economic harm, the FTC Act recognized other forms of harm.233 
Therefore, in concluding that LabMD’s security practices were 
unreasonable and lacked “even basic precautions,” the FTC held that 
actual harm is not necessary for a finding of “unfair” conduct.234 
Organizations can be liable if their practices create a risk of harm and 
negligent security practices were sufficient to create liability for data 
security breaches.235 
C. FTC on the Move 
The FTC has recently focused its data security guidance and 
enforcement on the threat of ransomware. FTC Chairwoman Edith 
Ramirez publicly announced that “[a] company’s unreasonable failure 
to patch vulnerabilities known to be exploited by ransomware might 
violate the FTC Act.”236 The FTC has also issued guidance on the topic 
of ransomware-prevention.237 Within this guidance, the FTC lays out what 
it minimally expects of organizations to defend against ransomware attacks: 
(1) Implement education and awareness programs to train 
employees to exercise caution and avoid phishing schemes; 
(2) Practice good security by implementing basic cyber hygiene 
principles; 
(3) Back up data early and often; and 
(4) Develop and test incident response and business continuity 
plans.238 
 
232. Id. at *68. 
233. Id. at *72. 
234. Id. at *1. 
235. Id. at *62–63; but see LabMD, Inc. v. FTC, 678 F. App’x 816, 822 (11th 
Cir. 2016) (circuit court granting stay pending appeal in favor of LabMD 
on order requiring LabMD to implement data security compliance measures). 
236. See Cara Salvatore, FTC Chair Threatens Action On Ransomware Holes, 
LAW360 (Sept. 8, 2016), https://www.law360.com/articles/837883/ftc-
chair-threatens-action-on-ransomware-holes. 
237. Ben Rossen, Ransomware: a Closer Look, FED. TRADE COMM’N, (Nov. 10, 
2016), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/blogs/business-blog/2016/11/
ransomware-closer-look. 
238. A lot of these practices that the FTC urges organizations to invest in are 
consistent with the technical recommendations offered in this Note, see 
id. 
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The FTC has also supported the use of standards promulgated by 
NIST and the use of NIST’s security framework.239 In fact, the FTC has 
concluded that the NIST framework and the FTC’s data security 
approach are “fully consistent.”240 Because of the relationship that exists 
between HHS and the FTC,241 and the FTC’s stance on and response 
to unreasonable data security practices, FTC enforcement may create 
a lot of issues for healthcare organizations. 
D. Implications for Healthcare Providers 
In light of the FTC’s decision in LabMD and its strong stance on 
ransomware protections, healthcare organizations have a strong 
impetus to make modifications to their HIS data security. While there 
is no private cause of action under HIPAA,242 OCR enforces HIPAA’s 
Security Rule.243 This enforcement process involves a complaint, a 
subsequent investigation, followed either by a resolution from OCR or 
a criminal violation that the DOJ will pursue.244 Now, the FTC may 
hold healthcare organizations personally liable for unfair and deceptive 
practices towards their patients for poor data security practices. 
First, ransomware presents a clear case of risk of harm, as opposed 
to actual harm. The fact that an unauthorized person accesses a HIS 
makes the substantial harm likely, which is sufficient for FTC action. 
Although no tangible economic harm may occur to patients for the 
intrusion of ransomware, the access to their ePHI is enough to create 
an unfair practice under the FTC Act. Second, because of recent 
ransomware attacks, all healthcare organizations are aware of the threat 
and how the attacks are typically carried out. Failing to take adequate 
preventative measures would be equivalent to Wyndham’s and 
LabMD’s negligent practices. Finally, the potential harm caused to 
 
239. See Andrea Arlas, The NIST Cybersecurity Framework and the FTC, 
FED. TRADE COMM’N (Aug. 31, 2016), https://www.ftc.gov/news-
events/blogs/business-blog/2016/08/nist-cybersecurity-framework-ftc. 
240. Id. (“The types of things the Framework calls for organizations to evaluate 
are the types of things the FTC has been evaluating for years in its Section 
5 enforcement to determine whether a company’s data security and its 
processes are reasonable.”). 
241. See, e.g., Sharing Consumer Health Information?, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH 
& HUM. SERV.(Oct. 2016)https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/
special-topics/HIPAA-ftc-act. 
242. 45 C.F.R. § 160.300-.552 (2016) (covering the enforcement process under 
HIPAA); see also FRANCOISE GILBERT, Enforcement, in A GUIDE TO 
HIPAA SECURITY AND THE LAW 101, 107-108 (Stephen S. Wu, ed., 2007). 
243. See Enforcement Process, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERV. 
https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/compliance-enforcement/
enforcement-process/index.html (last updated June 7, 2017). 
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patients is not reasonably avoidable by patients themselves. Unless 
healthcare providers wish to face the same consequences as these 
companies, they should take the appropriate steps to protect the data 
of their patients from ransomware, as well as other known and emerging 
threats. Thus, even if HIPAA is not amended, healthcare organizations 
should take action in light of potential FTC enforcement. 
V. Conclusion 
Sweeping changes to HIPAA’s Security Rule are impracticable and 
unnecessary. Specific modifications—as proposed in this Note—would 
better carry out HIPAA’s purpose to protect the privacy of patient 
ePHI from unauthorized persons. These proposed changes protect the 
data from unauthorized access in particular. New threats, such as 
ransomware, arise and expose chinks in the armor that HIPAA’s 
Security Rule supposedly placed over the body of ePHI, making the 
need for these changes increasingly clear. These proposed modifications 
would provide a heightened level of security while remaining flexible, 
as healthcare organizations all have different needs, capabilities, and 
budgets. While these changes would be beneficial, there is no single or 
perfect answer to the question of how to protect patient data in this 
digital world and digital economy. HIPAA should be modified for the 
benefit of patients, whose private and valuable information is held in 
trust by healthcare organizations. And even if these modifications are 
not adopted, healthcare organizations should act to better protect their 
patients’ data. 
